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LEGAL CAPITAL AND THE MODEL 
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT:  
AN ESSAY FOR BAYLESS MANNING 
JAMES J. HANKS, JR.* 
APPRECIATION 
Bayless Manning, now living in well-earned retirement in Boise, has been 
one of the most original thinkers and writers on American law of our time. His 
influence on corporation law in the United States can be favorably compared 
with that of Justice Story in the nineteenth century. 
As a practicing lawyer, teacher, writer, lecturer, legislative drafter, director 
of publicly held companies in the United States and abroad, advisor to the New 
York Stock Exchange, and active member of The American Law Institute and 
of the American Bar Association’s Committee on Corporate Laws, Bay 
Manning has had an unsurpassed influence on the evolution of the law of 
corporations in this country and elsewhere. His impact can be found in the legal 
capital provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), now 
enacted in whole or in part by over thirty states; in the MBCA’s former 
director-conflicting-interest provisions,1 for which he was the principal drafter; 
in The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance;2 and in 
the overgrown field of appraisal rights, where his seminal article, published in 
1962, is still the single most influential statement on that neglected subject.3 
Descended from a chief justice of Kentucky and raised by a single mother in 
pre–World War II Washington, Bay graduated from Yale in 1942 at nineteen 
and immediately joined the U.S. Army Signal Corps. In remote locations like 
the island of Kauai, he helped to decrypt the supposedly unbreakable Japanese 
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“Purple” code. After the war, he graduated from Yale Law School (where he 
was editor in chief of the Yale Law Journal); clerked for Justice Reed on the 
Supreme Court; practiced law in Cleveland with Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue; 
taught at Yale Law School; worked in the State Department;4 served for seven 
years as the transformative dean of Stanford Law School; then became 
president of the Council on Foreign Relations; and thereafter was a partner at 
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. Although he has at one time or 
another spoken Japanese, Norwegian, Spanish, and Hawaiian,5 he generally 
writes in English. When Bay generously associated me in writing the third 
edition of Legal Capital, it took us a year of weekends laboring in his One 
Lexington Avenue apartment, punctuated only by brief meals and walks in 
Gramercy Park. That year was a midcareer postgraduate course in corporate 
law, accounting, finance, equity pleading, legislative drafting, legal history, and, 
especially, writing. Bay said his target audience was “a reasonably intelligent, 
English-speaking, fourteen-year-old.” He felt that if he could explain something 
to her, anyone would understand it. Bay avoids grand words when simpler ones 
will do. He never uses “myriad” or “plethora” instead of “many” or “a lot.” Bay 
does not need or want to show off in his writing. He draws a sharp distinction 
between polysyllabic Latinate words and terser Anglo–Saxon ones, and he has a 
clear preference for the latter. Although he writes with greater elegance than 
any lawyer I have known, it is the elegance of uncluttered clarity, focus, and 
brevity—like the writing of another great lawyer, Lincoln. 
Because he has significantly influenced the practice, teaching, and writing of 
countless lawyers and teachers for more than sixty years; because he was the 
first to expose the intellectual emptiness of the nineteenth-century concepts of 
par value and stated capital and then created a new legal capital regime that is 
now widely accepted in the United States and increasingly elsewhere as well; 
and because I think he just might like it, this essay is for Bayless Manning. 
I 
THE EXPOSURE OF “LEGAL CAPITAL” 
The MBCA followed faithfully from the early nineteenth-century 
emergence of par value, stated capital, surplus, and the later enactment of 
statutes employing those concepts to limit the corporation’s power to make 
payments to its shareholders on account of their stock. For the MBCA’s first 
 
 4. Where he once observed (at first to himself and later to this author), while on a brief ride 
during the Vietnam War from Foggy Bottom to the White House with the secretary and the 
undersecretary, that the only person in the car who actually knew where he was going was the driver. 
 5. Yes, Hawaiian. I encountered Bay by chance in Honolulu at an ABA annual meeting, and he 
offered that he knew a place that made the best mai-tais in the islands. When we arrived, he began 
speaking to the Polynesian-appearing bartender in a language I did not recognize. As we were each 
taking our first sip of a perfectly stratified mai-tai—still the best one I have ever had—I asked him, in 
English, what language he was speaking with the bartender. He replied, “Hawaiian”—a legacy of his 
wartime service. 
HANKS 1/26/2011  
Winter 2011] AN ESSAY FOR BAYLESS MANNING 213 
thirty years, its distribution provisions contained both an equity solvency test 
and the traditional stated-capital or earned-surplus test.6 That is, a corporation 
could pay a dividend only if, after payment of the dividend, the corporation 
could pay its debts as they became due and the corporation’s assets exceeded 
the sum of its liabilities and stated capital. This was the case even though stated 
capital was a nominal, arbitrary, and economically irrelevant number. 
Bayless Manning first identified and revealed the vacuity of traditional legal 
capital statutes in the first two editions of his celebrated book, Legal Capital.7 
Then, during the 1980s, he served on the American Bar Association’s influential 
Committee on Corporate Laws, the author and continuing overseer of the 
MBCA. His three most important insights during this period were: 
First, all pro rata payments to shareholders on account of their shares—
whether by dividend, redemption, other reacquisition, or partial liquidation—
have the same economic effect on the corporation (a decrease in its assets, 
typically cash) and on the shareholders (no change in each shareholder’s 
percentage of shares owned). Therefore, there should be no difference in their 
legal treatment. Even a non-pro rata share acquisition by the corporation offers 
no more opportunity for board misbehavior than issuing shares in exchange for 
a parcel of land or a computer-software program of uncertain value.8 
Second, it makes no economic sense to base, even in part, the amount of 
assets that a corporation has the power to distribute on arbitrary and 
economically irrelevant figures like par value and its derivative, stated capital.9 
Third, there is no difference between “treasury shares”—shares that the 
corporation issues but later reacquires (whether through redemption or 
repurchase)—and shares that are authorized but never issued. Therefore, 
treasury shares serve no conceptual purpose and should be abolished.10 
As a result of Bay’s pioneering work, the MBCA’s financial provisions were 
completely overhauled, beginning with amendments in 1980 and continuing 
with the 1984 revision.11 The new provisions jettisoned the old capital and 
 
 6. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 45–46 (1969) (amended 1980). 
 7. See generally BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL (2d ed. 1981); 
BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL (1st ed. 1977). 
 8. See BAYLESS MANNING WITH JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 12–16 (3d ed. 1990) 
(discussing payouts to shareholders). 
 9. See id. at 92 (“A corporation’s ‘legal capital’ is a wholly arbitrary number, unrelated in any way 
to any economic facts that are relevant to a creditor. . . . [F]rom his standpoint the stated capital is 
simply a fortuitously-derived number that could as well have been taken from a telephone directory as 
from a series of unconnected and irrelevant historical events.”). 
 10. See id. at 190–92 (“[T]he concept of ‘treasury shares’ was a makeshift ameliorant to the 
artificial paralysis of ‘par,’ offering a way to permit shares to be sold at their market value. . . . 
[F]orgivable or not at the time of their inception, ‘treasury shares’ are today simply humbug.”). 
 11. Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 6, 45–46, 66–70 (1969) (providing stated capital and 
capital surplus tests for distributions to shareholders), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 (1984) 
(providing the “equity solvency” and “balance sheet solvency” tests for distributions to shareholders). 
See generally Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—
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surplus tests for distributions, as well as any apparition of par value or stated 
capital. In lieu, new section 6.40 substituted two tests for measuring a 
corporation’s power to make a distribution.12 Section 6.40(c), still unamended 
after more than twenty-five years, prohibits a corporation from making a 
distribution if, after giving it effect 
(1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual 
course of business [the so-called “equity solvency” test]; or 
(2) the corporation’s total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus 
(unless the articles of incorporation permit otherwise) the amount that would be 
needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the distribution, to 
satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders whose preferential 
rights are superior to those receiving the distribution [the so-called “balance sheet 
solvency” test].13 
The corporation must satisfy both of these tests. Note also that it must do so 
(1) at the time the distribution is authorized (except in the cases of a 
distribution of corporate indebtedness or a dividend paid after 120 days)14 and 
(2) after giving effect to the distribution, that is, assuming the distributed cash 
(or other assets) or corporate debt has been transferred to the shareholders.15 
In addition, and significantly, section 6.40(d) permits a board of directors to 
determine that a distribution is not prohibited under subsection (c) based 
“either on financial statements prepared on the basis of accounting practices 
and principles that are reasonable in the circumstances or on a fair valuation or 
other method that is reasonable in the circumstances.”16 This concept was 
formerly known as “revaluation surplus,” that is, surplus created by restating 
the balance sheet on a fair-market-value basis. In Delaware, which to this day 
still has a modified old-style liabilities-plus-stated-capital statute,17 the concept 
of revaluation surplus has been adopted by case law.18 
 
Amendments to Financial Provisions, 34 BUS. LAW. 1867 (1979) (presenting and discussing changes to 
the MBCA’s financial provisions). 
 12. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c) (1984). The MBCA defines a “distribution” as 
a direct or indirect transfer of money or other property (except its own shares) or incurrence 
of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of its shareholders in respect of any of 
its shares. A distribution may be in the form of a declaration or payment of a dividend; a 
purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of shares; a distribution of indebtedness; or 
otherwise. 
Id. § 1.40. Thus, fundamental to the MBCA’s unitary treatment of distributions is the recognition that 
the economic effect of a transfer of cash or other assets, or the incurrence of debt by the corporation to 
or for the benefit of the shareholders, has the same economic effect on the corporation and on its 
shareholders, no matter what the form of payment is or what it is called. 
 13. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c) (2008). 
 14. Id. § 6.40(e). 
 15. Id. § 6.40(c). 
 16. Id. § 6.40(d). 
 17. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2009); see MANNING & HANKS, supra note 8, at 82–84 
(discussing Delaware’s “nimble dividend” provision). 
 18. See Morris v. Standard Gas & Elec., 63 A.2d 577, 581–82, 585 (Del. Ch. 1949) (holding that 
directors of a Delaware corporation are under a duty to evaluate the assets on the basis of acceptable 
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Note too that the balance sheet solvency test treats as liabilities liquidation 
preferences of shares of stock that are senior on liquidation to the shares on 
which the distribution is proposed to be paid unless the charter specifically 
provides otherwise. Whether to include such an opt-out in the terms of 
preferred stock is always an important—and sometimes overlooked—economic 
issue for the corporation, prospective investors, and their counsel to consider. 
On the one hand, investors and their counsel, when negotiating the purchase 
terms of preferred stock, may be disinclined to agree to an opt-out, preferring 
to have their senior liquidation preference treated as a liability. This would 
result in an additional dollar-for-dollar block on the corporation’s power to 
make distributions to the common and other junior stockholders, thus 
increasing the underlying cushion of assets available for dividend (and, 
potentially, liquidation-preference) payments to the preferred shareholders 
(and for debt repayment to creditors). However, the preferred-share investors 
also have an interest in the corporation’s ability to raise additional common and 
other junior equity, which will further support the corporation’s ability to pay 
the preferred dividends and, if necessary, the liquidation preference. Increasing 
the corporation’s power to pay dividends furthers this interest. Thus, potential 
preferred investors will often agree to the opt-out. 
In addition, the 1980 amendments to the MBCA eliminated the concept of 
“treasury stock.”19 Previously, issued and outstanding shares reacquired through 
redemption or negotiated purchase continued to be treated as issued shares 
even though they were no longer outstanding. These shares were known as 
“treasury shares” and were so denominated in the stockholders’ equity section 
of the balance sheet with several different possible accounting treatments, some 
of them tied to the artificial concepts of par value and stated capital. 
Significantly, unless the charter specifically provided otherwise, treasury shares 
were (are, in those jurisdictions where they still exist) and always have been just 
as available for reissuance as authorized but never-issued shares. A person to 
whom the corporation issues shares is not likely to care, or even know, whether 
the shares were previously issued to and held by someone else, who later sold 
them back to the corporation.20 In its 1980 amendments, the Committee on 
Corporate Laws wisely concluded that issued and outstanding shares acquired 
by the corporation should return to the status of authorized but unissued 
 
data and by standards they are entitled to believe reasonably reflect present “values” and must be given 
“reasonable latitude” in this regard). 
 19. Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 2(h), 67–68 (1969) (providing that redeemed shares are 
canceled and considered authorized but unissued shares, unless their reissue is prohibited by the 
articles of incorporation, and that other reacquired shares may be either canceled and considered 
authorized but unissued shares or held as treasury shares), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.31 (1984) 
(providing that all reacquired shares are considered authorized but unissued shares). See generally 
Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Amendments to 
Financial Provisions, 34 BUS. LAW. 1867 (1979) (presenting and discussing the changes to the MBCA’s 
financial provisions). 
 20. MANNING & HANKS, supra note 8, at 190–92. 
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shares.21 Thus, the balance sheet for a corporation organized under the laws of 
an MBCA jurisdiction will not distinguish between (1) authorized and never-
issued shares and (2) authorized, formerly issued, but now-reacquired shares. 
Finally, any effective rule must have an effective remedy. Section 8.33(a) of 
the 1984 revision of the MBCA provides that 
unless he complies with the applicable standards of conduct described in section 8.30, 
a director who votes for or assents to a distribution made in violation of this Act or the 
articles of incorporation is personally liable to the corporation for the amount of the 
distribution that exceeds what could have been distributed without violating this Act 
or the articles of incorporation.22 
Personal liability for directors who approve the distribution provides an 
incentive for directors to reject a noncompliant distribution. However, section 
8.33 of the MBCA also provides that a director will not be liable if he or she 
complied with the standard of conduct set forth in section 8.30.23 To aid 
compliance with section 8.30, the MBCA permits a director to rely on “officers 
or employees of the corporation whom the director reasonably believes to be 
reliable and competent in the functions performed or the information, opinions, 
reports or statements provided;” and on “legal counsel, public accountants, or 
other persons retained by the corporation as to matters involving skills or 
expertise the director reasonably believes are matters (i) within the particular 
person’s professional or expert competence or (ii) as to which the particular 
person merits confidence.”24 Thus, a distribution may fail to comply with either 
the equity solvency test or the balance sheet solvency test, or both, of section 
6.40(c); yet the approving directors, if each of them acted in good faith, in a 
manner that he or she reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the 
corporation and with the requisite care, will escape liability.25 The MBCA, 
Delaware, and Maryland all provide for a right of contribution from other 
assenting directors and from shareholders.26 
 
 21. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.31(a) (1984); see Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes in the 
Model Business Corporation Act—Amendments to Financial Provisions, 34 BUS. LAW. 1867, 1869 
(1979) (discussing changes to section 6). 
 22. Id. § 8.33(a); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS 
§ 2-312(a) (West 2009) (providing essentially the same). 
 23. The MBCA currently provides that “[e]ach member of the board of directors, when 
discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.” MODEL. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) 
(2008) (amended 2009). In addition, directors must “discharge their duties with the care that a person 
in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.” Id. § 8.30(b). 
 24. Id. § 8.30(f). 
 25. It is good practice to have the chief financial officer or other responsible financial officer 
execute and deliver to the directors a certificate, confirming that, after giving effect to the proposed 
distribution, (1) the corporation will be able to pay its debts in the usual course of business and (2) the 
corporation’s assets will exceed its liabilities. See JAMES J. HANKS, JR., MARYLAND CORPORATION 
LAW form 9(b)(i) (Supp. 2000). 
 26. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.33(b) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174(b)–(c) (2009); MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-312(b) (West 2009). 
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It should be noted, however, that a director’s violation of section 8.33 may 
not be included in a charter provision exculpating directors from monetary 
liability to the corporation or shareholders.27 
 
II 
SECTION 6.40 AT WORK 
In its nearly thirty years as part of the MBCA, section 6.40 (together with 
section 8.33) has worked remarkably well.28 The principal questions have tended 
to collect around whether the payment of cash in a merger is a “distribution” by 
the acquired corporation, as well as the interpretation and application of the 
two solvency tests that are the heart of the statute. 
A.  Payment of Consideration in a Cash-out Merger 
The MBCA defines a “distribution” as “a direct or indirect transfer of 
money or other property (except its own shares) or incurrence of indebtedness 
by a corporation to or for the benefit of its shareholders in respect of any of its 
shares.”29 The paradigm of concern is a merger of a corporation (T for target) 
into another corporation (P for purchaser) or into or with a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of P (P Sub) in which T’s shareholders receive cash in exchange for 
their shares, and P winds up in control of T, either through absorption of T’s 
assets and liabilities or through P’s control of P Sub or T, depending, 
respectively, on whether a forward or reverse triangular merger is employed. 
At least two courts—both United States Courts of Appeals—have 
confronted this issue and reached opposite results.30 In both cases, T and P 
negotiated at arm’s length and entered into a merger agreement calling for a 
reverse triangular merger, with T’s shareholders exchanging their shares in T 
for the right to receive cash and P receiving new T shares. Thus, P became the 
 
 27. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2008); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009). 
Unlike the MBCA or Delaware, Maryland does not have an exception for improper dividends. MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.2 (West 2009). In addition, the Maryland charter-exculpation 
statute applies to both directors and officers. Charter-exculpation provisions have been applied by the 
courts without any surprising results. See, e.g., Hayes v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 249 F. Supp. 2d 
725, 733–34 (E.D. Va. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 78 F. App’x 857 (4th Cir. 2003); Grill v. 
Hoblitzell, 771 F. Supp. 709, 712 (D. Md. 1991); In re Walt Disney Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 
2006) (after ten years of litigation); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095–96 (Del. 2001). It is 
important to note that charter-exculpation provisions adopted under these state statutes only permit 
exculpation for violations of the law of the state of incorporation, not federal law or the law of another 
jurisdiction. For a history of charter-exculpation statutes, see James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent 
State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 
1207–10 (1988). 
 28. In addition, several non-MBCA states have substantially adopted section 6.40. E.g., COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 7-106-401 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS § 2-311 (West 2009); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 78.288 (2009). 
 29. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40(6) (2008). 
 30. In re C-T of Va., Inc., 958 F.2d 606 (4th Cir. 1992); In re Munford, Inc., 97 F.3d 456 (11th Cir. 
1996). 
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new and sole shareholder of T; and in both cases, creditors, or the corporate 
debtor in bankruptcy acting on behalf of creditors, sought damages against the 
former T directors for violation of the state-law counterpart of section 8.33 of 
the MBCA. 
In In re C-T of Virginia, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held that “[p]ayment of the merger consideration to C-T’s 
former shareholders simply does not fit within the plain language of [Virginia’s] 
definition” of distribution,31 which was identical to section 1.40(6). The court, in 
a finely nuanced opinion by Judge Wilkinson, reasoned that when C-T 
transferred the cash merger consideration, the recipients “were no longer the 
corporation’s—‘its’—shareholders, for their ownership interest had been 
lawfully canceled as of the effective time of the merger.”32 But while C-T’s 
shareholders’ shares were being canceled, the shareholders received, in 
exchange for those shares, the right to receive cash.33 Just because the cash was 
not actually paid to them until some later time, for example, upon tender of 
their share certificates, does not mean they had not already received the right to 
receive the cash. This situation is precisely parallel to a board’s authorizing a 
dividend, the corporation’s later sending a check for the amount of the 
dividend, and the shareholder’s subsequently cashing the check. The validity of 
the board’s action is tested at the time of authorization (unless the dividend is 
paid more than 120 days after authorization, in which case it is tested at the date 
of payment),34 not when the check is sent, received, or cashed. Thus, splitting 
hairs by focusing on the timing of events that substantively happen 
simultaneously is not a satisfactory rationale. Nor is it particularly helpful to 
state that “[a] corporate acquisition, structured as a merger, is simply a different 
animal from a distribution.”35 In support of this zoological proposition, the court 
erroneously stated that “[d]istribution statutes . . . traditionally apply to 
situations in which the shareholders . . . retain their status as owners of the 
corporation.”36 This, of course, overlooks those redemptions and negotiated 
share repurchases that completely extinguish all of the shareholder’s shares. 
In In re Munford, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit held that Georgia’s distribution and share-repurchase statutes, which 
included a solvency test, applied to a cash-out, reverse triangular merger.37 In 
affirming the district court’s denial of the defendant directors’ motion for 
summary judgment, the Court of Appeals stressed the approval of T’s directors 
to the merger and the provisions in the merger agreement for P’s pledge of 
“virtually all” of T’s assets as collateral for the loan that provided the cash paid 
 
 31. C-T, 958 F.2d at 610. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(e) (2008). 
 35. C-T, 958 F.2d at 611. 
 36. Id. 
 37. In re Munford, Inc., 97 F.3d 456, 459–60 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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to T’s shareholders in the merger.38 If the approval of the merger by T’s 
directors were a basis for applying state distribution statutes, however, every 
merger would be subject to them—a position that did not seem to bother the 
court in Munford,39 but which the court in C-T rightly noted was neither 
contemplated historically by merger statutes40 nor administratively applicable by 
T’s soon-to-be-replaced directors.41 
Although the court reached the right result in C-T, its analysis was 
unnecessarily tortured; and in Munford, the court was wrong in claiming that 
“nothing in these statutes precludes” their application to a merger or share 
repurchase that would cause the corporation to become insolvent.42 The 
straightforward and correct analysis is that the MBCA’s definition of 
“distribution” refers to the “transfer” of assets by only one corporation (“a 
corporation”),43 and that a merger is not an act that one corporation may 
undertake alone. The fact that a merger involves another party, acting 
independently and at arm’s length, is critical. Even if a corporation arranged a 
merger with another related party for no rational business purpose other than 
to transfer money or other assets (or incur indebtedness) to the shareholders 
without complying with the equity and balance sheet solvency tests, a court 
would be justified in holding that the transfer was by “a corporation to or for 
the benefit of its shareholders.”44 Therefore, the transfer would qualify as a 
“distribution” subject to the equity and balance sheet solvency tests of section 
6.40.45 
B.  Interpretation and Application of the Equity Solvency Test  
The equity solvency test of section 6.40(c)(1) is essentially a test of the 
corporation’s liquidity. There is ordinarily little difficulty in determining 
whether a corporation, even one in financial difficulty, is currently able to pay 
its debts in “the usual course of business.”46 Generally, it either is or is not 
paying its debts on time. The difficulties arise in determining the corporation’s 
ability to pay its debts in the usual course at some unspecified time in the future. 
The further in the future is the time when the determination must be made, the 
 
 38. Id. at 459. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Neither was this position, the court might have added, contemplated by most merger 
jurisprudence and practice. 
 41. C-T, 958 F.2d at 612. 
 42. Munford, 97 F.3d at 460. 
 43. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40(6) (2008). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. § 6.40. This interpretation is consistent with the official comment to the definition of 
“distribution”: “The term ‘indirect’ in the definition of ‘distribution’ is intended to include transactions 
like the repurchase of parent company shares by a subsidiary whose actions are controlled by the 
parent. It also is intended to include any other transaction in which the substance is clearly the same as 
a typical dividend or share repurchase, no matter how structured or labeled.” Id. § 1.40 cmt. 3. 
 46. Id. § 6.40(c)(1). 
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more difficult it is for the board to make the requisite determination at the time 
of its authorization. The official comment to section 6.40 recognizes this issue: 
[I]n determining whether the equity insolvency test has been met, certain judgments 
or assumptions as to the future course of the corporation’s business are customarily 
justified, absent clear evidence to the contrary. These include the likelihood that (a) 
based on existing and contemplated demand for the corporation’s products or 
services, it will be able to generate funds over a period of time sufficient to satisfy its 
existing and reasonably anticipated obligations as they mature, and (b) indebtedness 
which matures in the near-term will be refinanced where, on the basis of the 
corporation’s financial condition and future prospects and the general availability of 
credit to businesses similarly situated, it is reasonable to assume that such refinancing 
may be accomplished.47 
In addition to future sales and possible debt refinancing, a board could also 
consider, in determining equity solvency, possible asset sales (including 
factoring receivables and sale-leasebacks), pricing trends, equity raises, 
discounted pre-payment of existing liabilities, and compromise of contingent 
liabilities.48 As well, the directors would typically be expected to take account of 
the corporation’s business strategy and business plan, its current and pro forma 
financial statements (including cash-flow statements), and its budgets and 
material risk elements. 
Importantly, section 6.40(d) permits a board to base its solvency 
determination “either on financial statements prepared on the basis of 
accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the circumstances or 
on a fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances.”49 
While this permission is generally viewed as significant to satisfying the balance 
sheet solvency test,50 it clearly applies to the equity solvency test as well. Thus, if 
there is reason to believe that some liabilities may be discharged for less than 
the amount shown on the corporation’s balance sheet, prepared according to 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), that fact may be taken into 
account in determining equity solvency on the basis of a non-GAAP balance 
sheet. Conversely, if it is not likely that the full amounts of the accounts 
 
 47. Id. § 6.40 cmt. 2. 
 48. In Paratransit Risk Retention Group Insurance Co. v. Kamins, a suit by an insurer against an 
insured company, the trial court was told to determine whether the company was insolvent under 
Colorado’s “equity insolvency test,” based on section 6.40(c)(2). 160 P.3d 307, 314–18 (Colo. App. 
2007). Whenever a corporation is no longer operating in the “regular course of business,” the court 
explained, the trial court should look to the following federal bankruptcy-court factors in determining 
whether the corporation is generally not paying its debts as they become due: “(1) the number of debts 
unpaid each month compared to those that are paid; (2) the amount of the delinquency; (3) the 
materiality of the nonpayment; and (4) the nature of the debtor’s conduct of its financial affairs.” Id. at 
316 (citing In re Leek Corp., 52 B.R. 311 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re Reed, 11 B.R. 755 (Bankr. 
S.D.W. Va. 1981)). Note that, appropriately, the number of factors is fewer and their applicability 
narrower for a corporation not operating in the “regular course of business.” 
 49. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(d) (2008). 
 50. See infra text accompanying note 65. Perhaps one reason for this misconception is that section 
6.40 is discussed in the official comment under the heading “Balance Sheet Test,” including two 
subheadings “Generally Accepted Accounting Principles” and “Other Principles”—an oversight that 
should be corrected by giving the discussion of subsection (d) its own heading. See MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 6.40 cmt. 4 (2008). 
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receivable as shown on the most recent GAAP balance sheet are likely to be 
collected, that too should be reflected in a non-GAAP balance sheet. 
In In re Vista Eyecare,51 the debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding objected to 
proof of a claim for the exercise of a $900,000 put option on the basis that the 
claim was unenforceable under the Georgia counterpart to section 6.4052 
because payment of the claim would have made the debtor unable to pay its 
debts as they came due in the regular course of business.53 The bankruptcy court 
disallowed the claim, explaining that 
[a]pplying the equity insolvency test requires directors to assess a company’s future 
prospects and is necessarily subjective to a degree and hence a matter of judgment. . . . 
The words “would not be able to pay” in subsection (c)(1) of [Ga. Code Ann. §] 14-2-
640 require a board of directors to determine the likelihood that future cash flow will 
be sufficient to pay debts when they come due . . . . Thus, relevant considerations 
include whether the enterprise can continue as a going concern and can maintain or 
replace financing necessary to pay debts as they come due. The time horizon to which 
a board of directors must look under this section may vary with the circumstances of 
the particular company, but that horizon extends at least through the date on which a 
company is obligated to make substantial payments on existing large obligations, 
particularly if that date will occur within one year of the date of the proposed 
distribution.54 
The court noted further that the fact that the company’s current assets are 
less than its current liabilities—a common standard of liquidity (that is, equity 
solvency)—is not dispositive of insolvency; instead, the question is whether the 
debt could be refinanced when it comes due.55 
Likewise, in Meeks v. PRN, Inc.,56 a case involving a private company (a 
franchisee), the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment because the two directors (one of whom was the plaintiff) who 
authorized the stock-purchase contract had not made a sufficiently “formal” 
analysis of the company’s cash flow.57 Therefore, held the district court, the 
stock-purchase contract, which apparently provided for the company’s purchase 
of at least some of the plaintiff’s shares in the company, was illegal and 
unenforceable.58 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, 
however, that under Oregon’s distribution statute, based on section 6.40, 
the determination that the company is solvent enough to make a distribution may be 
made on the basis of any method that is reasonable under the circumstances. In this 
case, the company was small and closely held, which tends to vitiate the necessity of a 
 
 51. In re Vista Eyecare, 283 B.R. 613 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002). 
 52. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-640 (2009). 
 53. Vista Eyecare, 283 B.R. at 615–16, 620. 
 54. Id. at 622–23, 625. 
 55. Id. at 623. 
 56. Meeks v. PRN, Inc., No. 92-37019, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23768 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 1994). 
 57. Id. at *1–3. 
 58. Id. at *3. 
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detailed, formal analysis. The board, moreover, was entitled to take into account the 
future prospects of the company, such as its ability to refinance current liabilities.59 
The court noted that a “$300,000 line of credit promised by FSI [apparently 
the franchisor] would have covered all of [the company]’s liabilities at the time 
of the distribution. That fact alone may be sufficient to support a reasonable 
conclusion that [the company] would be able to pay its debts as they came 
due.”60 
Almost all board decisions—hiring a new CEO, starting a new product line, 
closing a plant, borrowing money—are to a large extent based on predictions, 
or at least expectations, of the future. Thus, determining a distribution’s effect 
on the corporation’s ability to pay its debts in the usual course of its future 
business is well within the accepted ambit of the directors’ business judgment. 
Section 6.40 leaves plenty of room for just the kind of decisions that directors 
are routinely expected and well equipped to make—prudential business 
judgments about what is in the corporation’s best interests, based on their 
experience and their understanding of the corporation and its circumstances. 
Even the existence of a significant future obligation that the corporation is 
currently unable to pay should not preclude a board’s determination that the 
corporation will be able to discharge the obligation when it becomes due, 
through refinancing, future profits, or otherwise, and that, therefore, the 
corporation currently satisfies the equity solvency test. In determining the effect 
of a present distribution on the corporation’s future ability to pay its debts in the 
usual course of business, the board should also be able to consider not only 
measures to increase liquidity through monetization of assets and reduction of 
liabilities, but also the possible enhanced ability of the corporation to raise 
additional equity, especially if the stock has an established yield. 
Generally speaking, the further in the future is the time for determination of 
solvency, the greater the latitude that directors should be accorded in reaching a 
judgment on the corporation’s ability to pay its debts at that time. The 
determination of future solvency is simply a component of the board’s overall 
responsibility for financing the corporation, which in turn is part of its general 
responsibility to oversee the management of the corporation’s business and 
affairs.61 The board’s determination of solvency is, therefore, entitled to the 
same deference as any other routine exercise of the directors’ business 
judgment. Like all business decisions by the board, this determination must 
have some rational basis, even though the decision made on this basis may 
subsequently turn out to be wrong. As always, however, the requirement of 
some rational basis is not a high bar and does not require (or even permit, 
unless the presumption of the business judgment rule is overcome) a 
 
 59. Id. at *4 (citing Robert C. Art, Corporate Shares and Distributions in a System Beyond Par: 
Financial Provisions of Oregon’s New Corporations Act, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 203, 249–50 (1988)). 
 60. Id. at *4–5. 
 61. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2008). 
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retrospective judicial assessment of whether, at the time of the determination, 
there was another determination that might have had a more rational basis.62 
Of course, in fulfilling her duty of care under section 8.30(b) of the MBCA 
or under applicable case law, a director must become informed and should 
participate in the board’s deliberations. In particular, a distribution’s effect on 
the corporation’s solvency at some future time is a matter about which many 
directors—even financially sophisticated ones—will want information and 
advice from the corporation’s chief financial officer and financial advisors, its 
inside or outside counsel, and its internal or independent auditors. As noted 
above, section 8.30(f) specifically authorizes a director to rely on reports and 
information provided by officers or other employees so long as the director 
reasonably believes them to be reliable and competent, and on the advice of 
legal counsel, financial advisers, and other experts on matters that the director 
reasonably believes to be within their competence. 
C.  Interpretation and Application of the Balance Sheet Solvency Test 
The balance sheet solvency test requires the corporation’s assets, after the 
distribution, to at least equal its total liabilities (including senior liquidation 
preferences as liabilities, unless the charter permits otherwise).63 The most 
important element of the balance sheet solvency test is the substantial latitude 
permitted to the board in determining whether the corporation is solvent in the 
balance sheet sense. 
As noted above with respect to the equity solvency test,64 the board may 
base its solvency determination “either on financial statements prepared on the 
basis of accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the 
circumstances or on a fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in the 
circumstances.”65 Thus, the official comment to section 6.40(d) explicitly 
“contemplates that generally accepted accounting principles are always 
‘reasonable in the circumstances’ and that other accounting principles may be 
perfectly acceptable, under a general standard of reasonableness . . . .”66 The 
non-GAAP method that is most frequently employed by boards in making 
solvency determinations, especially balance sheet solvency, is probably the so-
called “fair value” method. This method is particularly prevalent where the 
corporation has assets, for example, real estate, that have significantly 
appreciated over the value at which the assets are carried on the corporation’s 
GAAP balance sheet (typically cost, perhaps less depreciation as well). 
 
 62. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009) (“[A] court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of the board if the [board’s] decision can be attributed to any rational business 
purpose.” (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 63. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c)(2) (2008). See supra text following note 18. 
 64. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 65. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(d) (2008). 
 66. Id. § 6.40 cmt. 4(A). 
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In Meeks,67 the court recognized that even intangible assets such as “name 
recognition and relationships with employees and clients” could be “some of 
the most valuable assets of a service firm.”68 The court further observed that 
“[a] prospective buyer or associate (such [as] FSI) would find that goodwill 
valuable and be willing to pay for it.”69 
Of course, a fair-valuation balance sheet must be “reasonable in the 
circumstances.”70 This means that it must be based on credible, reasonably 
current values of comparable assets. Although not required, valuation of assets 
by a knowledgeable, independent expert will tend to enhance credibility and, 
thus, the perception of the directors’ discharge of their duty of care. If the fair-
valuation method is chosen, then it should not be applied selectively—no 
“cherry picking”—and all assets should be fair-valued. In addition, the values 
should be based on a method consistently applied to similar asset classes. 
Likewise, if the assets are fair-valued, then the liabilities should be fair-valued 
as well, absent circumstances that would make doing so not “reasonable in the 
circumstances.” Fair-valuing liabilities may often result in reducing them 
through discounting to present value on a risk-adjusted basis. This is generally 
reasonable as many (but not necessarily all) creditors prefer to be paid less now, 
rather than the full principal amount later (especially if the debtor is in a shaky 
financial condition). The size of any discount that a creditor is willing to accept 
will be influenced by the maturity, interest rate, prepayment penalty, and other 
terms, as well as the creditor’s assessment of the debtor’s financial condition 
and ability to pay the debt when due. A corporation seeking to fair-value its 
liabilities may enhance the credibility of its efforts by communicating directly 
with various creditors and finding out what they would take in current payment 
to discharge the obligation. 
The MBCA does not explicitly state whether to treat as liabilities 
obligations such as rent and other future payments not normally included as 
liabilities on a balance sheet prepared according to GAAP. However, since the 
official comment to section 6.40 unequivocally states that GAAP is “always 
‘reasonable in the circumstances,’”71 it is logical that balance sheets prepared on 
some non-GAAP basis that is also “reasonable in the circumstances” would not 
have to treat as liabilities non-balance sheet liabilities under GAAP. In any 
event, non-balance sheet obligations will generally be taken into account in 
applying the equity solvency test. 
 
 67. See supra text accompanying notes 56–60. 
 68. Meeks v. PRN, Inc., No. 92-37019, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23768, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 1994). 
 69. Id.; see also In re Fid. Bond & Mortg. Co., 340 B.R. 266, 289, 293, 301 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) 
(approving for the purposes of the balance sheet solvency test an insolvency analysis that included a 
value for “goodwill” as an asset), aff’d sub nom. Fid. Bond & Mortg. Co. v. Brand, 371 B.R. 708 (E.D. 
Pa. 2007). 
 70. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(d) (2008). 
 71. Id. § 6.40 cmt. 4(A). 
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Several of these issues were on display in Lerner v. Lerner Corp.72 In that 
case, the corporation was a subchapter S corporation under the Internal 
Revenue Code, and the only stockholders were two brothers—Theodore, who 
owned 73.6% of the stock, and Lawrence, who owned 26.4%.73 After years of 
squabbling and litigation, they reached a settlement providing that 
[a] payment shall be made by Lerner Corp. to [Lawrence] after the end of each 
calendar year, beginning with calendar year 1988, equal to [his] proportionate share, 
based on the percentage of stock ownership, of the difference between the total 
amount of Lerner Corp.’s management income for such calendar year and the total 
amount of Lerner Corp.’s business expenses for such calendar year which relate to 
management activities as distinguished from development activities.74 
More litigation followed, as a result of which “a substantial sum of money 
was paid to Lawrence with interest.”75 Concluding (on the basis of an opinion 
from outside counsel, a former Internal Revenue Commissioner) that it was 
necessary to make a proportionate payment to Theodore in order to preserve 
the corporation’s subchapter-S tax status, the corporation borrowed money to 
make the payment.76 Lawrence asserted that the distribution to Theodore was 
unlawful because it violated Maryland’s equity solvency test, which is based on 
section 6.40 of the MBCA.77 Theodore and Lerner Corporation did “not dispute 
that the corporation’s liabilities exceeded its assets for the period of time 
between the distribution and stock sale.”78 The court held, nevertheless, that 
when determining whether the corporation would violate the balance sheet 
solvency test after the distribution, the “directors are entitled to consider a 
corporation’s current and future sources of cash.”79 In upholding the Lerner 
Corporation board’s determination of balance sheet solvency, the court quoted 
from the MBCA: “In determining whether the equity insolvency test has been 
met, certain judgments or assumptions as to the future course of the 
corporation’s business are customarily justified, absent clear evidence to the 
contrary.”80 If the court was aware that it was relying on equity insolvency 
language to address balance sheet solvency, it did not indicate it. Similarly, the 
court quoted from Fletcher: 
The directors are entitled to make certain, reasonable judgments or assumptions 
about the future course of the corporation’s business. . . . The directors may utilize a 
cash flow analysis based on a business forecast and budget for a sufficient period of 
 
 72. Lerner v. Lerner Corp., 711 A.2d 233 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). 
 73. Id. at 235. 
 74. Id. at 235 (alterations and emphasis in original). 
 75. Id. at 236. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 240. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 241. 
 80. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 cmt. 2). 
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time and draw [a] conclusion that the corporation can reasonably expect to satisfy 
known obligations as they mature over that period.81 
Although recognizing that “after the distribution to Theodore was made, 
the Corporation’s liabilities exceeded its assets,”82 the court concluded, on the 
basis of these two authorities, neither of which relates to balance sheet solvency 
and both of which expressly refer only to equity solvency, that 
[u]nder these circumstances, it was reasonable for the directors of Lerner Corp., in 
determining whether the Corporation would remain solvent, to consider that the 
Corporation was going to raise additional cash by issuing additional stock, that the 
Corporation would be able to pay its debts as they became due, and that the loan 
utilized to fund the distribution to Theodore was guaranteed by an entity owned by 
Theodore. Therefore, there would be no violation of section 2-311 so long as the 
board exercised its discretion in good faith. There is no assertion by Lawrence that the 
board members acted other than in good faith.83 
Consideration of future cash needs and receipts is certainly relevant—
indeed, fundamental—to an assessment of equity solvency, which is inherently 
forward-looking in its focus and determination. The very words “pay its debts as 
they become due” in section 6.40(c)(1) indicate a prospective application over a 
period of time. In the case of section 6.40(c)(1), that period of time begins once 
the distribution has been given effect. A balance sheet, on the other hand, is 
static; it speaks as of a particular point in time. In the case of section 6.40(c)(2), 
that point in time occurs immediately “after giving . . . effect” to the 
distribution. In both subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2), “giving effect to the 
distribution” means reducing the corporation’s assets by the amount of the 
proposed distribution (or, in the case of a distribution of corporate 
indebtedness, increasing the corporation’s liabilities) as of the time that the 
distribution is proposed to be made. There is no indication, in either the 
language of section 6.40’s official comment or elsewhere, that the point in time 
when balance sheet solvency is determined occurs after giving effect to the 
distribution. Indeed, it is hard to imagine when that point in time could be. 
There would be little reason or utility for a balance sheet solvency test that 
might (or might not) be satisfied at some indeterminate point in the future and 
then perhaps only briefly, even momentarily. 
In Lerner, even though the stock issuance did, in fact, occur, generating 
sufficient funds to pay off the money borrowed by the corporation to make the 
distribution to Theodore, there was no contract or other commitment for the 
stock issuance at the time the board made its determination. It is pure 
speculation whether, under section 6.40(d), there might be “circumstances” in 
which it would be “reasonable” for the directors to base a solvency 
determination under section 6.40(c)(2) on a balance sheet giving prospective 
effect to an issuance of equity that no one had yet committed to buy on terms 
 
 81. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5329.10 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1995)). 
 82. Id. at 240. 
 83. Id. at 241. 
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that had not yet been negotiated. Lawrence apparently did not even suggest it; 
Theodore and the Lerner Corporation therefore found no reason to address the 
question. 
 
III 
LEGAL CAPITAL REVISITED 
It has been over a quarter-century since section 6.40 was added to the 
MBCA and, as noted above, it seems to be working well. It is firmly anchored 
on economically rational principles—equity solvency, balance sheet solvency, 
and fair value—that are familiar to business people, both borrowers and 
creditors, and relatively easy (with occasional exceptions) for lawyers and 
courts to understand and apply. Still, it is instructive and useful to ask whether 
improvements could be made. 
Two United States courts of appeals have reached diametrically opposing 
positions on whether and, if so, under what circumstances a merger may be a 
“distribution” under the MBCA. It would be helpful if the Committee on 
Corporate Laws considered the issue and either modified the statute or the 
official comment to reflect its view. Other enhancements to the official 
comment could include clarifying the role played by non-balance sheet 
obligations in the board’s determination of both balance sheet and equity 
solvency. Also, it would be useful to expand on the process for fair-valuing 
liabilities, whether through discounting to present value or otherwise. When the 
comment was written, credit-default swaps, hedging programs, and other 
derivatives were still in their infancy—if they existed at all—and were not 
widely used to protect a company’s financial condition. Consideration should 
also be given to the extent and manner in which a board could properly take 
these instruments into account in determining both equity and balance sheet 
solvency. Likewise, risk management has become a central focus of board 
concern and that too may be an element a board should consider in assessing 
solvency. 
Perhaps the largest question about section 6.40, however, is whether the 
balance sheet solvency test serves any useful purpose not already served by the 
equity solvency test. Consider the following two balance sheets: 
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Balance Sheet No. 1 
Excess of assets over liabilities (balance sheet solvency), but inability to pay 
debts in the usual course of business (equity insolvency) 
 
Assets     Liabilities    
       
Cash 
 
 $100  Accounts Payable   $500  
Accounts Receivable 
 
 200  Notes Payable (Long-Term)   1000  
Inventory 
 
 300    $1500  
Plant and Equipment 
 
 600     
Real Estate   1000  Shareholders’ Equity    
       
    Stated Capital 
 
 $100  
    Capital Surplus 
 
 400  
    Retained Earnings   200 
      $700  
   
$2200 
    
$2200  
 
In this balance sheet, the corporation has a healthy excess of assets over 
liabilities. But its excess of current liabilities (accounts payable) over current 
assets (cash and accounts receivable)—the so-called “current ratio”—leaves the 
corporation unable to pay its debts as they become due (equity insolvency). The 
fact that the corporation is balance sheet solvent does nothing for the creditors. 
The problem for creditors, rather, is the company’s inability to pay its debts in 
the usual course of business. 
Now, consider the next balance sheet: 
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Balance Sheet No. 2 
Deficit of assets over liabilities (balance sheet insolvency), but ability to pay 
debts in the usual course of business (equity solvency) 
 
Assets     Liabilities    
Cash   $1200  Accounts Payable   $300  
Accounts Receivable  400  Notes Payable (Long-term)  2500 
Real Estate  600     
        $2800 
         
    Shareholders’ Equity    
    Stated Capital   $100  
    Capital Surplus   400  
    Retained Earnings   (1100)  
      $(600) 
   
$2200 
    
$2200  
 
In this balance sheet, the corporation has a significant deficit of assets over 
liabilities but also a significant excess of current assets (cash and accounts 
receivable) over current liabilities (accounts payable). So, the corporation is 
easily able to pay its debts as they are coming due at the present time, even 
though its total liabilities exceed its total assets. The balance sheet solvency test 
implicitly assumes that all the liabilities are due and payable currently, which, of 
course, is almost never completely the case. Further, as noted earlier, the 
official comment and the courts have recognized that the board is entitled to 
take into account a wide range of considerations in determining whether the 
corporation will be able to pay long-term liabilities that it might not now be 
able to pay. Thus, once again, it is the company’s ability to pay its debts in the 
usual course of business that matters most to creditors—not the fact that it has 
more assets than liabilities. 
Of course, the company should clearly be permitted under section 6.40(d) to 
write down its liabilities to what the creditors would currently accept in 
exchange for the debts. But that does not explain why the balance sheet 
solvency test actually helps creditors. Moreover, the balance sheet solvency test 
can lead to unintended or distortive results. For example, because of 
significantly lower share prices beginning in the second half of 2008, many U.S. 
companies found that their defined-benefit pension plans were substantially 
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underfunded due to the decrease in the value of the plans’ assets.84 This resulted 
in increased pension-funding liabilities for these companies and often severe 
reductions in shareholders’ equity, thus threatening compliance with the 
balance sheet solvency test, even though these companies were generating 
significant revenue, earnings, and cash flow. Maryland addressed this problem 
by providing an exception to the balance sheet solvency test for Maryland 
corporations with net earnings in the current fiscal year, in the prior fiscal year, 
or in the prior eight fiscal quarters,85 very much akin to Delaware’s nimble-
dividend provision.86 The nimble-dividend approach, however, is not a 
refinement or enhancement to the balance sheet solvency test; rather, it is an 
exception to the test, underscoring the inadequacy and irrelevance of the 
balance sheet solvency test. 
 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The relatively smooth operation and interpretation of the MBCA’s 
distribution provisions is an excellent example of the reflection, sophistication, 
care, and skill of the Committee on Corporate Laws in considering, drafting, 
revising, and updating the Model Business Corporation Act over the past sixty 
years. The overall success of the distribution provisions is also a tribute to the 
many lawyers, judges, and law professors who have participated in the 
Committee’s very successful efforts to advance the law of corporations in this 
country and elsewhere—none more so than Bay Manning. 
 
 
84.  See Underfunded Pension Plans, FINANCIAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION, http://www.fpanet.org/ 
ToolsResources/ArticlesBooksChecklists/Articles/Retirement/undefundedpensionplans (last updated 
Mar. 16, 2009) (discussing recent decreases in funding ratios for defined benefit plans). 
 85. Act of May 7, 2009, ch. 295, § 1, 2009 Md. Laws 1483, 1487. 
 86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2009). 
